Overcoming the Unit Rule: Caught at the Warning Track (Part III)

While it is an interesting proposition, overcoming the unit rule by adopting one of the three proportional allocation scenarios mentioned will be politically impossible. The reforms would have to be adopted one of two ways: state-by-state or nationally.

If the reforms were adopted based on the initiative of one state (as in Nebraska and Maine), the results could be catastrophic to one of the two parties, depending upon the state. The best example is recently California entertained the notion of adopting the Congressional District Method. The effects in 2008 would have minimal due to Obama's overwhelming victory, but the change is still telling. Let's assume, without sufficient data, that electoral votes would be apportioned based on the 61% to 37% Obama victory in CA. Obama would have won 35 electoral votes instead of 55, and McCain would have won 20 instead of 0. This would have brought their total electoral vote totals to Obama (344) to McCain (193). Still a huge victory, but if any number of Bush states (namely, Ohio or Florida) had adopted this method in 2000 or 2004 then George W. Bush would not have been president. Harm would be caused to one party if individual states moved to this method at independent times. Coordination is the only way for success.

However, states have very little incentive to coordinate with each other. States have been viewed as the "labrotories of democracy" because they can experiment with creative policy proposals. But, experimentation, as stated above, would cause more harm than national good. The parties need to take the initiative to demand reform of the electoral college from states. Or it could go as far as a law from Congress or a constitutional amendment (not really necessary, though).

Why would states want to do this? There is incentive for smaller states like Maine or Nebraska to experiment because it could give more attention to their other-wise electorally insignificant state. The Obama campaign proved this theory in 2008 by flooding resources into Nebraska's 2nd Congressional District. However, larger states like California would lose electoral power through proportional allocation. Instead of guaranteeing 20.4% of the electoral votes needed to win, it could represent a 50-50 split between the two major party candidates and not be as significant a dividend. Therefore, this reform could never reach fruition if larger states refuse to enter into the system. We are again debating the divide between large and small states, just as we were during the creation of the electoral college.

Another reason NOT to do this would be that it would create very close elections. If we are indeed a 50-50 nation (a purple nation), then proportional allocation should (under best circumstances) reflect that 50-50 divide. Since 1900, we have had eight elections where the victor did not receive a majority of the popular vote. Those elections, in our model, could all be sent to the House of Representatives, if the winner does not get a majority (instead of just a plurality) of electoral votes. So, adopting this method may cause even more unrest with the legitmacy of our electoral process.

In conclusion, I do not think this reform is likely to pass any time soon, if ever. No one state is likely to want to take the initative on this, and the national parties historically have little power to dictate policy to states. This would likely only ever come into effect through national referendum. However, the prospects of that are even more unlikely.

Well, it was fun to ponder, at least.

- Wyatt